This paper is about the interaction of the meanings of Noun Phrases (NPs) and various operator-like elements that a sentence may contain: negation, intensional verbs (want, expect, hope for, seek), tenses, modal verbs, aspectual operators, and other elements. I focus mainly on negation and intensionality, with discussion of aspect-related problems at the end 1 .
The puzzle of the relation between negation and intensionality
This paper is about the interaction of the meanings of Noun Phrases (NPs) and various operator-like elements that a sentence may contain: negation, intensional verbs (want, expect, hope for, seek), tenses, modal verbs, aspectual operators, and other elements. I focus mainly on negation and intensionality, with discussion of aspect-related problems at the end 1 .
The patterns of interaction of NPs and various operator-like elements sometimes show negation and intensional operators patterning alike, sometimes differently. Negation is not an intensional operator; so the question arises why it sometimes, but not always, patterns with the intensional operators.
In Section 2, we review (briefly and superficially) some of the basics of NP interpretations, the semantics of the relevant operator-like elements, and their interaction. Then we look at how some natural languages encode certain relations between NPs and certain operators, giving us a window on some aspects of the "logic of natural language". There we find a puzzle in the Russian "genitive of negation" construction, which seems to lump negation and some intensional verbs together (Section 3); this puzzle forms the empirical core of the paper. In Section 4 we work our way through some hypotheses about what is going on, concentrating on the interactions among scope, NP interpretation, and the semantic properties of negation and intensional operators. Section 5 adds aspect to the picture, drawing especially on recent works by Paul Kiparsky and by Dmitry Levinson. In Section 5.1 I discuss Kiparsky's study (Kiparsky 1998) of parallels between partitive case in Finnish and imperfective aspect in Russian, and explore the possibility that Finnish partitive, Russian imperfective, and Russian Genitive have semantic similarities that may be described in terms of 'decreased referentiality'. In Section 5.2 I adapt some arguments from Dmitry Levinson's work on a slightly different kind of parallel between imperfectivity and genitive case under negation, to further support the idea of similarity between NPI contexts and intensional contexts. In the concluding section I opt for a view of "family resemblance" properties that many but not all instances of negation and intensionality share, so as to allow for equally important differences that show up among the family members (Section 6).
Background. Scope ambiguity, NP interpretations, and the semantics of operators.
A classic illustration of intensional contexts is a sentence like (1).
(1) Mary is looking for a professor who teaches Greek.
This sentence is ambiguous. On its de re (transparent) reading, Mary is looking for a certain individual whom the speaker describes as a professor who teaches Greek; Mary need not be aware of that property of the person she is looking for. On its de dicto (opaque) reading, Mary is looking for anyone who meets that description; in this case she need not know whether there actually is any such person. It is the NP interpretation which is called de re or de dicto; it's the context which is called (referentially) transparent or opaque (Quine 1960) . As with is looking for ___, many opaque contexts also have an alternative construal as transparent.
At least on the de dicto reading of the NP, the context Mary is looking for _____ is an example of an intensional (more accurately, non-extensional) context. The main criterion for calling something an intensional context is the "failure of substitutivity of co-extensional expressions."
Substitutivity principle: Substitution of extensionally equivalent expressions in an extensional context always preserves truth-value.
Corollary: Failure of substitution of extensionally equivalent expressions in a given context to preserve truth-value indicates non-extensionality (non-transparency) of those contexts.
If the extension of professor who teaches Greek in the given context is the same as the extension of professor who teaches Latin, then substituting one for the other in (1) may not preserve truth-value, while the same substitution in the extensional context (2) will always preserve truth-value 2 .
(2) Susan is sitting next to a professor who teaches Greek. (unambiguous) In (1) and (2), the difference is in the verbs: look for creates an opaque context (is an "intensional verb"), while sits next to creates a referentially transparent, extensional, context. It's an open issue whether look for has a different sense in the case of the transparent reading. See discussion of Russian ždat' 'wait for, expect' below.
Other intensional verbs include seek, owe, need, lack, prevent, resemble, want, request, demand. On the Fregean analysis (Frege 1892) , as developed further by Carnap (1947) , Kripke (1963) , Montague (1970) , an expression like professor who teaches Greek has as its extension in each possible state of affairs the set of professors who teach Greek, and as its intension the property that determines what extension is picked out in each possible state of affairs. In extensional contexts, an expression contributes its extension to determining the extension of the whole; in intensional contexts, it contributes its intension.
Other intensional constructions involve modal verbs (may, must, can, should, might, etc.) , propositional attitude verbs like believe, some adverbs (necessarily, possibly, and others).
To illustrate the basic interaction of NP semantics with negation, we can use sentence (3). The corresponding affirmative sentence has no such ambiguity. The ambiguity evidently results from the interaction between the quantifier 10 and the negation. Note that ambiguity is also removed if the NP is unambiguously referential (e.g. this question.)
We can observe that negation is NOT intensional, at least not when analyzed in the usual way as a truth-functional operator. That can be shown by trying out substitutions with a professor who teaches Greek and a professor who teaches Latin in simple negative contexts like "John isn't sitting next to ___" on the assumption of co-extensionality, or similar examples with coextensional definite descriptions. If one controls for the scope ambiguity noted above, the choice of description has no effect on the truth value.
We can note that the kind of ambiguity seen in (3) arises with indefinite descriptions quite generally, but not with definite descriptions 3,4 .
NPs with wide scope over negation or over intensional operators have existential commitments, and narrow scope NPs do not. In Section 3.3 we will describe the distribution of Russian Genitive case on NPs under the scope of negation or an intensional verb. It will be argued that the Russian "Genitive of Negation" and "Genitive of Intensionality" are very similar phenomena, with the Genitive needing to be licensed by occurring under such an operator. There are further conditions on the occurrence of Genitive that will be illustrated and discussed in Section 3.3, but many of the core cases do seem to signal absence of existential commitment.
Tenses, quantifiers, and focus-sensitive operators like only, even, and always all give rise to scope ambiguities, and some of what is discussed below applies to them as well. The same questions of similarities and differences arise across different classes of operators, with different details in each case.
Natural language patterns -strategies of marking different interpretations differently.
An ambiguous sentence or construction in one language may or may not translate into an ambiguous sentence or construction in another. In this section we note the use of the subjunctive/indicative distinction in Romance relative clauses to express opaque vs. transparent readings of objects of intensional verbs (Section 3.1) and the existence of negative and positive polarity items that yield unambiguous interpretations of some negative sentences (Section 3.2). We then briefly describe two contexts in which the alternation of Russian genitive case with accusative case serves a similar disambiguating function, one case involving negation, the other involving intensional verbs (Section 3.3.).
3 There is a different ambiguity to worry about with definite descriptions, one concerning the presuppositions or assertions of existence and uniqueness ('the present king of France' examples). I am staying away from those problems here. 4 Dorothy Grover (p.c.) has called my attention to the possibility that when negation is used in a speech act of "rejection", as suggested in Grover (1981) it might be argued to be intensional, much as the context "Jones denied that ___" is. But she is not herself ready to argue that "It is not true that" is ever intensional.
Marking opacity with subjunctive.
The English example (1) There are many theories of the semantics of the subjunctive, in many cases relating the subjunctive fairly directly to 'alternative possible situations' (Farkas 1982 , Giannakidou 1994 , Giannakidou 1995 , Portner 1992 . But no existing formal tools have yielded a direct account of the semantics of the subjunctive, and it remains a lively topic of debate.
Negative Polarity Items
English and many other languages have expressions that can occur in negative contexts but not in simple affirmative ones. The actual distribution of these "Negative Polarity Items" (NPIs), words like any, ever, at all, is more complicated than that simple description might suggest, and semantically very interesting. Ladusaw's discovery that a large part of the distribution of NPIs in English could be accounted for with the notion of monotone decreasing functions 7 (Ladusaw 1980) was probably the first achievement in linguistic work in formal semantics that made use of essentially model-theoretic properties of meanings, properties that had no syntactic or "LF" counterpart expressible with tree geometry or "semantic features". Subsequent work by Ladusaw and others has uncovered additional model-theoretic properties that help account for differences among different NPIs within and across languages (Giannakidou 1998 , Hoeksema 1986 , Kadmon and Landman 1993 , Kanazawa 1994 , van der Wouden 1997 , as well as the interplay with pragmatic and syntactic factors (Hoeksema 2000 , Krifka 1994 , Ladusaw 1996 , Linebarger 1987 , Progovac 1994 . 5 Thanks to Maribel Romero and Paula Menéndez-Benito for checking my Spanish data. Paula uncovered some interesting Google data about the optionality of the preposition "a" in (4b). While both Paula and Maribel reported the "a" as simply optional in their own dialects when the verb is subjunctive, i.e. on the opaque reading, Paula's Google data indicated that the use of "a" is relatively rare with the subjunctive. 6 Susan Rothstein (p.c.) notes that at least in British English, would may be used in opaque contexts in a way that seems parallel to the use of the Spanish subjunctive: (i) Susan was looking for a professor who would teach Greek. (opaque); (ii) Susan was looking for a professor who taught Greek. (ambiguous). 7 For introductory expositions of this notion, see (Ladusaw 1980 , Larson 1995 , Partee et al. 1990 ).
As is well-known, the class of "downward-entailing contexts" (contexts inside the scope of a monotone decreasing function) include clauses under sentential negation, the antecedent (but not the consequent) of a conditional, the inside of an NP headed by every or no (but not one headed by some or three). And it is in these downward-entailing contexts that NPIs like any, ever, at all can occur.
(5) a. *Bill answered any questions.
b. Bill didn't answer any questions. c. *Some students who answered any questions passed the test. d. Every student who answered any questions passed the test.
What the semantics of the NPI words themselves is has been the subject of much research; to a first approximation, the NPI any is a variant of the indefinite some, and is like an existential quantifier with obligatorily narrow scope -but there is much more to be said about it, and much debate about whether and how it is related to the "free choice" any that shows up in certain modal contexts (You can ask any doctor) and seems like a special kind of universal quantifier 8 .
The existence of these NPIs gives English some minimally contrasting unambiguous pairs like the following: These NPIs are not signaling intensionality, since negation is not an intensional construction. But their role seems in a certain sense analogous to that of the subjunctive in marking intensionality in Spanish. We return to the question of the parallels below in Section 4.
Russian Genitive of Negation and intensional verbs
Russian has an interesting construction called "Genitive of Negation", illustrated below; it involves substituting Genitive case for Accusative (on objects) or Nominative (on nonagentive subjects) of many verbs when the whole sentence is negated. The construction raises many puzzles, and has been the subject of intensive research for over a century (Babby 1980 , 2001 , Ickovic 1974 , Neidle 1988 , Padučeva 1992 , Perlmutter 1983 , Pesetsky 1982 , Peškovskij 1956 , Timberlake 1975 , Tomson 1903 . The semantics of the construction is something that Vladimir Borschev and I are investigating . Most researchers agree 9 that a Genitive-marked NP under negation, as in (7b) below, is an indication that the NP has narrow scope with respect to negation, much like the choice of any in (6b) above.
(7) a.. On ne polučil pis'mo. he NEG received letter-ACC.N.SG 'He didn't receive the (or 'a specific') letter.' 8 Of equal and related interest are the open-class family of 'arbitrarily small amount' expressions like the slightest sound, the least effort, which can also occur in both NPI and 'free choice' contexts, but not in ordinary contexts (except as literal superlatives). On the semantics of the polarity items themselves, and the relation of NPI any and 'free choice' any, see (Carlson 1980 , Fauconnier 1979 , Horn 1999 , Kadmon and Landman 1990 , 1993 , Partee 2004 . 9 This is probably correct; but some problems for this view identified in ) have yet to be resolved.
b. On ne polučil pis'ma.
he NEG received letter-GEN.N.SG 'He didn't receive any letter.'
It was pointed out by Neidle (1988) that Genitive case is also used to mark opaque objects of certain intensional verbs (although not all, and there is variability in whether it is optional or obligatory.) The puzzle is: why is the same construction used to mark both? Negation is not intensional, so why should negation and intensionality pattern together, as they do in a number of natural language phenomena? Is this just coincidence, or is there some generalization to be uncovered here? In the next section, we consider some of these broader questions.
Hypotheses
The puzzles of the Russian Genitive of Negation and Genitive of Intensionality may be considered as part of some wider questions: (i) Which ambiguities of interpretation get morphosyntactically disambiguated in different languages, and how? (ii) Which phenomena may pattern together with respect to morphosyntactic disambiguation across languages? And is there some general explanation for the answers that we get to these two questions? In this section we consider some possible directions for an answer with respect to the phenomenon of the Russian Genitive.
Scope differences.
On the classical linguistic view, both kinds of phenomena illustrated above are simply scope phenomena: an NP, if it is not unambiguously referential (this horse), may have wider or narrower scope than a given operator, as illustrated in the glosses above.
Each operator has its own semantics -intensional verbs, negation, tenses, quantifiers, adverbs, etc. On this view the meaning of the operator stays fixed, the meaning of the NP stays fixed, and the only thing that varies is the relative scope of the two. This captures part of the core of the phenomenon, a piece which needs to be captured by any account. But if one stops here, we make no predictions about which ambiguities get distinguished by some sort of morphosyntactic marking in some languages, nor about which phenomena most often pattern together across languages.
In the case of the Russian Genitive, for instance, the only NPs that can get marked Genitive in the Genitive of Negation and Genitive of Intensionality constructions are NPs which would otherwise receive Nominative or Accusative case, and this Genitive marking can happens only to nominative subjects and accusative objects under the scope of sentential negation or under the scope of a transitive intensional verb. It does not happen to NPs that fall under the scope of a quantifier, nor under the scope of a modal verb or modal adverb. And in some (not all) Gen Neg environments, it is possible for a proper name or deictic pronoun to occur in the Genitive, even though it would be conventionally said that such elements are scope-invariant. Brown is one of a number of Slavists who have argued that Gen Neg must be syntactically licensed by sentential negation but is not always semantically interpreted as under the scope of a real semantic negation (Brown and Franks 1997, Brown 1999 ). This fact may represent a partial grammaticization of a phenomenon whose prototypical instances reflect an original semantic distinction.
Possible non-uniform NP meanings.
On some recent approaches, it is suggested that the NP meanings may not be constant; perhaps some NPs are "licensed", in form and/or in meaning, by certain operators governing them. This hypothesis is particularly appealing for constructions involving direct objects of transitive verbs (and non-agentive subjects of some intransitive verbs), where one is most likely to find special markings analogous to the Russian genitive of negation. ("Object incorporation" in Greenlandic Eskimo, with obligatory narrow-scope interpretation (Bittner 1987 , Van Geenhoven 1998 , Accusative-Partitive alternation in Finnish (Kiparsky 1998 ) (more on this in Section 5), and related phenomena in Turkish (Enç 1991 ) and other languages .
All such proposals have in common that Accusative-marked NPs are higher on some kind of scale(s) of referentiality and topicality than object NPs that are marked with some oblique case like Genitive or Partitive or not marked at all. There appears to be a correlation between NPs that are "good, canonical subjects or objects" and have more highly "referential" interpretations, and NPs that are in some sense "demoted" from canonical subject or object position and have "weak" interpretations. But as Aissen (2003) emphasizes, different languages draw different distinctions; some languages pay attention to scales of animacy, some to scales of referentiality, some to both, and where they draw 'cutoff lines' varies from language to language. 10 In some early work, the condition for the Russian Genitive of Negation was said to be that a Genitive-marked NP must not only be under the scope of negation but must be indefinite (Babby 1980) ; an alternative recent hypothesis is that Gen Neg NPs must be non-specific (Babyonyshev and Brun 2002) .
A number of authors, including Pesetsky (1982) and Pereltsvaig (1997) , have taken the fact that the GenNeg construction is almost invariably found under the relatively local scope of sentential negation (but see Partee and Borschev 2002) as grounds for seeking to assimilate it to negative polarity phenomena. Pesetsky suggests that the GenNeg construction reflects the presence of a null NPI quantifier (analogous to English any), which itself occurs in the nominative or accusative, and which, like many other Russian quantifiers, governs the genitive case in its complement. Pereltsvaig extends Pesetsky's analysis to explain the interactions between GenNeg and aspect. These analyses have plausibility in the prototypical cases but face some difficulties when the NP in the GenNeg construction is a pronoun or a definite NP headed by a demonstrative or an explicit quantifier.
Property types and other "demotions" of NPs
Some formal semanticists have proposed that the actual semantic "type" of NPs changes in some of these constructions (Kagan 2005 , Partee and Borschev 2004 , Van Geenhoven 1998 , Zimmermann 1993 . On this view, "canonical" NPs are either simply referential (type 10 There is also a great deal of interesting current work on different kinds of indefinite pronouns across languages and the nature of the differences among them. Where English distinguishes someone from anyone, Russian has half a dozen different forms different meanings and different distributions. See (Haspelmath 1997 , Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002 , Yanovich 2005 ). Pereltsvaig's work draws explicit connections between this range of indefinites in Russian and the various kinds of polarity contexts, particularly examining the differences between non-veridical operators and monotone decreasing operators (Pereltsvaig 2000 (Pereltsvaig , 2004 . e), like names, demonstratives, most personal pronouns, and some definite descriptions, or else quantificational ("generalized quantifiers" in the work of Montague (1973) , Lewis (1970) and Barwise and Cooper (1981) ). "Opaque" objects of intensional verbs, however, as in (1), are interpreted as properties, the type normally associated with predicates rather than with argument-position NPs (Partee 1986 ). Zimmermann (1993) , one of the first to make such a proposal, advanced the hypothesis that opaque objects of intensional verbs have property type rather than entity type or generalized quantifier type. He argued that such an analysis can explain several things, of which two are central. The first is the obligatory narrow scope of opaque objects: since on his proposal they are never true quantifiers, they can never take "optional wide scope" as true quantifiers usually can. And secondly, his analysis can account for often-noted but never explained restrictions on the kinds of NPs that can be interpreted opaquely. Many NPs, both definite and indefinite, can get both de dicto and de re readings. But those NPs which are most obligatorily quantificational, like each student, most students, are most resistant to getting any de dicto or 'opaque' reading under an intensional verb. This is seen in example (9) from Zimmermann (1993) , where we see it is impossible to get a 'narrow scope' de dicto reading with a quantificational object of the verb seek.
(9) (a) Alain is seeking a comic book. (ambiguous) (b) Alain is seeking each comic book. (unambiguous; lacks ambiguity of (c)) (c) Alain is trying to find each comic book. (ambiguous).
The fact that both readings are available in (9c), where the opaque context is created not by an intensional transitive verb but by an infinitive-embedding construction which provides a locus for a simple scope ambiguity, provides a further argument for treating verbs like seek as taking a non-standardly interpreted NP complement. If we assume that the embedded verb find in (9c) takes normal e-type or generalized quantifier objects, then the ambiguity of (9c) is ordinary scope ambiguity 11 .
But what about negation? So far we have seen several ideas for the treatment of opaque objects of intensional verbs, but none that extend in a straightforward way to negation, which is a sentence-level operator and not an intensional one. Giannakidou (1994 Giannakidou ( , 1998 , looking especially at Greek, which also shows commonalities in the marking of NPIs under negation and of opaque objects of intensional verbs, suggested that some languages take the main semantic property of NPI-licensing constructions to be not downward monotonicity but nonveridicality 12 .
The fact that some NPs can occur only in non-veridical contexts (any student, the slightest sound) increases the plausibility of the conjecture that some NPs (a student) may have a "less referential" meaning in a non-veridical context than they do in a veridical context, whether that notion of "less referential" is to be cashed out in terms of a shift to property type or in some other way.
The use of the notion of nonveridicality offers one promising answer to the question of what negation and the intensional verbs have in common: both are non-veridical operators. At the same time it is just one semantic property, not a unifying "category", so it leaves open the expectation that other properties distinguish negation from intensional contexts.
Or coincidence?
Of course, it is also possible that it is mere coincidence that the same morphological case is used in Russian to mark NPs to be interpreted under the scope of a negative operator and NPs to be interpreted under the scope of an intensional verb (the latter far from uniformly, at that). Or, more likely it could be something more than coincidence but less than a very deep connection.
13 Not all intensional contexts are in fact non-veridical, although they "typically" are. While veridical intensional operators (like know, necessarily, debatably identify) are less likely than non-veridical ones (like suspect, possibly, seek, want) to take subjunctive sentential complements or subjunctive relative clauses in NP complements in the Romance languages or to take genitive NP objects in Russian, it is certainly not the case that all and only non-veridical operators license subjunctive in Romance or genitive NPs in Russian.
Certainly one does not want to claim that the connection is too deep, or it would be surprising not to see clearer evidence of it across the world's languages; NPIs and 'intensional-polarity' items may have some non-accidental degree of resemblance but as far as my limited knowledge goes, they are far from identical in general.
14 But further evidence of non-accidental similarity in Russian and Romanian comes from facts noted by Farkas (1985) and Kagan (2006) , both of whom go so far as to suggest that negation is an intensional operator. Farkas observed that negation in Romanian can sometimes license a subjunctive relative clause on an NP under the scope of negation, as in (10), and Kagan showed that the same holds for Russian, as in (11b) 15 .
(10) În România nu existǎ oameni care sǎ creadǎ în el. (Farkas 1985 :128) In Romania not exist people who SUBJUNC believe in him In Romania there are no people who believe in him.
(11) a. #Ja videl čeloveka, kotoryj by sčital inače. (Kagan 2006: 3) I saw man-ACC that SUBJUNC consider differently I have seen a man that thinks otherwise. 13 Thanks to Diane Proudfoot for pushing me on these points in discussion of this work at a Philosophy Department Seminar at the University of Canterbury in May 2006, and to Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy for suggesting that a 'family resemblance' account might be more successful than a search for a single unifying factor. 14 A suggestive but not conclusive indication of their similarity across languages can be taken from the diagrams developed by Haspelmath in his typological study of kinds of indefinite pronouns (Haspelmath 1997) . Contexts that correspond approximately to NPI contexts and contexts that reflect various sorts of intensionality are relatively near one another in his diagram, indicating that they are fairly often grouped together in licensing particular forms of indefinite pronouns (like any in English), but far from always. 15 The direct object in (11a) and (11b) is masculine animate, a class for which Genitive and Accusative have the same morphological realization. It is therefore impossible to determine whether (11b) is an instance of Gen Neg. It can be shown, however, that subjunctive relative clauses can occur on Genitive, Nominative and Accusative NPs under the scope of negation, with a non-absolute preference for Genitive. b. Ja ne videl čeloveka, kotoryj by sčital inače. I NEG saw man-ACC/GEN that SUBJUNC consider differently I haven't seen a man that would think otherwise.
If negation is not an intensional operator and yet it licenses subjunctive in examples like (10) and (11b), and we want a unified account of the distribution of subjunctive, there seem to be two options. Either there is some common feature shared by negation and intensional verbs such as non-veridicality that is responsible for licensing subjunctive, or negative sentences are more able than affirmative ones to accommodate the addition of a silent modal operator that in turn licenses subjunctive. I am inclined to favor the second alternative, in part because not all negative sentences allow NPs with subjunctive relative clauses, and there seems to be a difference in potential modality between those that do and those that do not. Let us look briefly at some issues in the semantics of negation before continuing with this issue. Heim (1982) suggested, and Kratzer (1989) argued more thoroughly, that negation is best analyzed in some cases not as a simple one-place propositional operator, but as a covert negative quantifier, dividing any sentence it applies to into a restrictive part and a nuclear scope, much like the overtly quantificational never, in no case. Kratzer proposes two different kinds of negation, one yielding a proposition that will be true in all or none of the situations in a given world ('generic negation'), and the other, 'accidental negation', a focus-sensitive operator which presupposes a domain and asserts that in this domain there is no instance of something or other; the domain must be large enough so that the proposition will be persistent (will not become false if one moves to a larger domain). Kratzer gives as a pair of relevantly contrasting sentences (12 a-b).
Negation and implicitly intensional quantification
(12) a. Paula isn't registered in PARIS.
b. PAULA isn't registered in Paris.
For sentence (12a) to be true, it must be evaluated in a situation large enough to include all places where Paula is registered; it then asserts that within such a situation, it is not true that Paula is registered in Paris. By contrast, for (12b) to be true, it must be evaluated in a situation that includes everyone registered in Paris, and it asserts that within such a situation, it is not true that Paula is registered in Paris. Informally, the first says that among the places where Paula is registered we will not find Paris, whereas the second says that among all the people registered in Paris we will not find Paula. The truth-conditions are not substantively different, but the implicit quantification over relevant situations is different.
As Kratzer notes, sentences with 'accidental negation' can become generic or modal by the addition of an overt or covert modal or generic operator, and in general there may be nothing in the overt form of a negative sentence to distinguish whether it is to be understood as 'accidental' or 'generic' negation.
Some negative sentences are 'about' quite small situations, others 'about' much larger ones. Consider (13) and (14). (13) This morning there wasn't a newspaper in the driveway. (14) He hasn't met a woman who understands him.
Although both a newspaper in (13) and a woman who understands him in (14) are 'nonreferential', the first is indirectly more specific than the second. The first concerns the absence of an expected newspaper on a particular occasion, while the second is intuitively much closer to sentences about seeking and finding: in all his encounters with women, he has not encountered any with the property of understanding him. Overtly each just denies the existence of a newspaper or 'a woman who understands him' in a certain situation; but the second situation is understood as a large one that invites us to think about many possible women who might have understood him. The negation together with the implicit quantification over women seems to invite implicit modality, hence quantification over possible women (or possible situations).
With such notions in mind, let us contrast sentence (11b) above, where a subjunctive relative clause sounds normal, with sentence (15a), where it does not 16 ; sentence (15b), with indicative, is much preferred.
(15) a. *(?) Kakoj-to gost' ne vidal devočki kotoraja by nosila krasnoe plat'e. some-TO guest NEG saw girl-GEN who-NOM SUBJUNC wear red dress (#) Some guest didn't see a woman who wore (subjunctive) a red dress.
b.
Kakoj-to gost' ne vidal devočki kotoraja nosila krasnoe plat'e. some-TO guest NEG saw girl-GEN who-NOM wear red dress 'Some guest didn't see a girl who was wearing a red dress.' I hypothesize that the difference might be understood as follows. Although both (11b) and (15a) deny the existence of some kind of situation, they nevertheless differ in specificity / modality. In (15a), the phrase kakoj-to gost' 'some guest', both because of kakoj-to (specific unknown) and gost' 'guest', which is situation-relative, strongly implicates that we are talking about a narrowly constrained situation: a particular party, for instance. And the sentence says that within that situation, call it s p , the party situation, there was no situation s' such that this guest saw in s' a girl who was wearing a red dress in s'.
Sentence (11b), on the other hand, it isn't about a single occasion. It's implicitly "I've never seen a man who ..". It quantifies over all past situations, and in a sense over all the men I've ever seen, and says that in no situation have I ever seen a man who (thought/ would think) otherwise.
Hence it seems that negation in (11b) is helping to license some modality, in comparison to both the affirmative (11a) and the single-episode negative (15a). It's not only the implicit quantificational "never", quantifying over a wide range of sub-situations, but the sentence also seems to suggest a characterization of a 'kind' of man I've never seen, and to be considering not just accidental properties like being in a red dress, but dispositional properties: what he would think about some issue if it were presented to him. The affirmative (11a), like the negative (15a), seems most likely to be understood as a being about single episode, although in principle it could be saying that at least one out of all the men I ever saw had that property. This characterization is rather vague and intuitive, and more work will be needed to sharpen it up.
Partitivity and Aspect in relation to Negation and Intensionality
What has been said so far about the relation between negation and intensionality has been based principally on the form and interpretation of NPs under the scope of negative or intensional operators. Previous work on various relationships between aspect and quantification (Bach 1986 , Filip 1992 , Filip 1999 , Krifka 1986 , Krifka 1987 , Mehlig 1983 , Partee 1999 would suggest that we might find further relevant evidence in the behavior of aspect under negative or intensional operators.
Two recent lines of work suggest connections of negation and intensionality to aspect, particularly through similarities between imperfectives and partitives or genitives, including some that show up in particular under negation. One is the work of Kiparsky (1998) arguing for a close parallel in function between the Finnish partitive and the Russian imperfective, discussed in Section 5.1. The other, even more relevant, is recent work of Dmitry Levinson (Levinson 2005a (Levinson , 2005b on parallels in the history of Slavic Genitive of Negation and Slavic Imperfective in Negated Imperatives, discussed in Section 5.2. In later work in progress (Levinson 2006a (Levinson , 2006b ), Levinson explicitly connects irrealis contexts with negative polarity contexts. Kiparsky (1998, 272-3) focuses on the concept of boundedness and its role in the semantics of both partitives and imperfectives; he notes that the concept of boundedness (Russian predel'nost') is standard in Slavic aspectology. He cites Dahl & Karlsson (Dahl and Karlsson 1976, Dahl 1985) as having emphasized the parallelism between the partitive vs. accusative case contrast in Finnish and the aspect contrast in Russian. "They point out that if either the verb is atelic (does not denote a completed event), or the object is an indefinite bare plural, then Russian in general requires imperfective aspect, and Finnish requires partitive case (see (16a)). Thus, in (16a) perfective aspect (in Russian) and accusative case (in Finnish) require both that the verb is telic, and that the object is plural and definite. The same sentences with imperfective aspect and partitive case, respectively, are three ways ambiguous (see (16b)): (16) (telic V, indef. NP) (2) 'He was writing letters' (… when I came) (atelic V, indef NP) (3) 'He was writing the letters' (… when I came) (atelic V, def NP)" (pp. 272-3) However, Russian native speakers 17 disagree with one aspect of the data Kiparsky cites from Dahl and Karlsson, suggesting that the Russian imperfective has a narrower range of interpretation than the Finnish partitive: namely, that the Russian version of example (16b) cannot have interpretation (1), but must be interpreted as atelic. If one tries to append the continuation "… and left" in the most direct way, as in (17a), the result is ungrammatical. If one expands it into "…, and after that he left" as in (17b), it becomes grammatical, but the letters are then understood as incomplete. (17) This and a few other similar problems with the data might seem to undermine one of Kiparsky's main claims, namely that Russian imperfective aspect, like the Finnish partitive, expresses an 'unboundedness' property of the whole VP level regardless of whether the unboundedness arises as a result of NP-related properties or of verbal-aspectual properties. But this may be a problem only 18 with the particular choice of examples or the context in which they are being interpreted, where the contrasting examples make it hard not to focus on aspectual information. It is well known that Russian imperfectives can often have a telic interpretation in appropriate contexts, where the focus is not on completion or noncompletion. The problem may be in part with the indefinite plural object pis'ma 'letters', given that there is no conventional 'packaging' of pluralities of letters, and in part the possibility that when considering minimal pairs differing in aspect, one tends to interpret the aspectual information as focused. Let us then tentatively assume that the problems noted above are not fatal, and that other examples, considered in appropriate contexts, would have the properties Kiparsky attributed to his examples.
Kiparsky (1998) on Finnish Partitive and Russian Imperfective
Then is the partitive in Finnish an instance of the same general phenomenon of 'decreased referentiality" that we have been looking at above? Possibly, although the parallels are by no means exact.
Kiparsky shows a number of clear and interesting parallels, and argues for an interesting generalization about coercion (see below) which helps to explain some of the non-parallels. As he notes, Krifka had already analyzed the semantics of partitivity and of imperfectivity in a parallel fashion, unifying the meanings of the partitive case and the progressive by analyzing both as predicate modifiers that mean 'part of':
"Thus PART(Pred) and PROG(Pred) denote the set of entities (resp. eventualities) that are parts of entities (eventualities) that have the property Pred." (Kiparsky 1998, p. 277) Krifka, like Kiparsky after him, was interested in showing how under certain circumstances, either an unbounded NP meaning or an unbounded verbal (aspectual) meaning could lead to similar or the same result (unboundedness) at the VP level 19 . For Krifka, the crucial properties that would allow either a partitive NP or an imperfective verb to have the same effect on VP interpretation were (i) that the verb be one with divisive reference (P(x) implies P(y) if y is part of x), and (ii) that the thematic relation connecting the verb with its object be the Incremental Theme relation, well-known from the work of Dowty (1989 Dowty ( , 1991 and Krifka (1992) . Kiparsky argues that Krifka's analysis might be right for Mordvinian, an earlier stage of Finnish, but not quite right for Finnish; the difference between his own analysis, crucially relying on his own definition of boundedness, and Krifka's analysis need not concern us here; they agree on most of the central examples. Both offer formalizations of the same leading idea, that 'unboundedness' in some sense is a property both of partitive meaning and imperfective meaning.
Kiparsky's paper makes it clear that languages can differ considerably in the relevant dimensions of unboundedness that they group together, and offers an explanation for some of the differences via an interesting constraint on coercion. "Both partitive and imperfective morphology can mark different semantic variants of unboundedness. Although these run parallel in Finnish and Russian in many cases … this is not always the case. Differences in how languages interpret unboundedness result from different coercion of bounded expressions into unbounded expressions and vice versa." (pp. 289-90). The principle that Kiparsky offers to account for these differences is that aspect can coerce shifts in the lexical meanings of verbs, while case can coerce shifts in the lexical meanings of nouns, and not vice versa 20 .
In quite a few works on the Russian Genitive of Negation, it is observed that a genitivemarked NP is in some sense 'less referential' than an accusative-marked NP, and it was noted above that both negative and intensional contexts are conducive to 'decreased referentiality' of NPs that occur within them. Unboundedness per se may not be a symptom of 'decreased referentiality', but partitivity, which is just one kind of 'unbounded' interpretation, does seem to be. Kiparsky notes that negated verbs in Finnish require partitive objects. But there is no immediate parallel between Finnish partitive and Russian imperfective in that respect; in normal declarative sentences, aspectual contrasts are maintained under negation 21 , and only a partial parallel between Finnish partitive and Russian Genitive, since Russian Genitive is normally optional rather than obligatory under negation In the next subsection, we discuss some work by Dmitry Levinson that does uncover some relevant parallels between partitivelike interpretations of Russian imperfective and of Russian Genitive of Negation.
Levinson on Imperfective in Negated Imperatives and Genitive of Negation
Whereas Kiparsky argues that genitive in Finnish and imperfect aspect in Russian are both used to mark a property of the whole VP, 'unboundedness', the Russian genitive is more closely bound up with the NP and its semantics. The Russian genitive (especially Object Gen Neg; also object partitive Gen) is not like Finnish genitive: although the lexical semantics of 20 These constraints may seem not to allow for the kind of 'semantic bleaching' of verbs that is found with subject Genitive of Negation in Russian existential sentences, as discussed in Partee 1998, 2002) . But there is probably a principled distinction between this kind of coercion, if it can be called that, and the kind Kiparsky's constraints apply to. See the description of how such 'bleaching' works in the cited papers. 21 A positive, although not very strong, correlation between imperfective aspect and the choice of genitive as opposed to accusative under negation is discussed in . There it is argued that decreased referentiality is supported by the use of the imperfective, not because of the unboundedness associated with a progressive interpretation of imperfective, but rather through habitual or generic interpretation of the imperfective form. This is not the use of imperfectives discussed by Kiparsky, Krifka, or Levinson. the verb and aspect are relevant in an indirect 'licensing' kind of way, what is central is the NP-semantics. The NP should be "less referential" in some sense; and there may well be more than one way for an NP to be 'less referential' (much as there are several different kinds of 'imperfective' meaning), including being 'quantificational/partitive', being 'modalized/intensional' (not necessarily actual), being property-type or kind-type or 'abstract' in some sense. The relevance of verbal and aspectual semantics is to license such kinds of readings.
But Dmitry Levinson in recent papers and handouts (Levinson 2005a (Levinson , 2005b (Levinson , 2006a (Levinson , 2006b has indeed identified some interesting parallels between the Russian Genitive of Negation and Russian imperfective aspect, especially in the context of negation. He takes a historical perspective, concentrating on the similarity of possible motivation of historical development of Gen Neg and Imperfective of Negated Imperative.
The Gen Neg phenomenon has been described in earlier sections of this paper. The phenomenon of imperfective in negated imperatives, or "Imperfective of Negation", concerns the fact that in Russian and some 22 other Slavic languages, only imperfective aspect can be used in negative imperatives that express intentional actions. Levinson proposes that these two phenomena can be given a parallel historical explanation, one that relies on the 'partitivity' of the initial semantics of both genitive case and imperfective aspect and on the semantic properties of the licensing negation.
In Levinson (2005b) , Section 3.2, he states as a commonly accepted historical explanation for the Genitive of Negation that it developed from partitive. Levinson supports the explanation offered by Kuryłowicz (1971) : In the initial Stage 1, Gen Neg was really the partitive, and was used only with nouns that could also take partitive in the affirmative, mainly mass nouns and plurals. What motivated it was that under negation, the partitive gives a stronger negation than the accusative, since not drinking 'of water' entails not drinking 'the' water, and not vice versa. (The direction of entailment is opposite in affirmatives.) "Due to the tendency to intensify the negation, this usage becomes more common than the nonemphatic accusative." (p.13) Then in Stage 2, "this usage of the genitive becomes associated with negation, and not the partitive meaning, and by analogy spreads to the nouns that are not used with partitive in positive sentences, that is, singular count nouns."(p.13)
Levinson argues that the explanation offered in Bogusławski (1985) of the restriction to imperfective aspect in negated imperatives expressing intentional action is parallel to Kuryłowicz's explanation for Gen Neg. Bogusławski's explanation applies most straightforwardly to accomplishment verbs, for which imperfective verbs denote activities that are not necessarily completed, while corresponding perfective verbs entail completion. As a result, in a simple affirmative sentence, the perfective will entail the imperfective, while under the negation, the direction of entailment is reversed 23 .
( The entailments in (19) provide the foundation of Bogusławski's explanation for preferring imperfectives in negated imperatives: using the imperfective makes the command stronger. The negated imperfective command prohibits the activity and not just its completion. And here too the tendency to make negation emphatic leads to the preference for the stronger form, and frequent use then leads to grammaticization. The fact that the effect holds for intentional actions ('prohibitives') and not for unintentional ones ('preventatives', often achievements rather than accomplishments or activities and often construed as warnings, like 'Don't be late for the lecture') is explained by the absence of any 'activity' stage for unintentional actions, so that the imperfective cannot be used to 'strengthen' the negated achievement imperative.
Levinson summarizes: "As was shown above, both constructions can be explained as grammaticalization of an emphatic alternative due to overuse of emphatic negation. In negative imperatives imperfective is stronger than perfective. Negation with partitive direct object is stronger than with accusative. The explanation given by Bogusławski (1985) for negated imperatives and the first stage of Kuryłowicz's (1971) explanation for the genitive of negation have the same structure." (p.16).
As Levinson notes, there are differences in the two constructions as well: Gen Neg in its later stage of development has become dissociated from Partitive and no longer has any necessary partitive meaning, while in 'Imperfective of Negation', Imperfective is still imperfective and is still understood as such -it only went through Stage 1.
In his later paper, Levinson (2005a) adds some discussion of French de and its use in partitives and in negation, showing that it is partly parallel to Russian Gen Neg in generalizing from an original source as a partitive construction to one that can be licensed by negation alone. In this paper he is also more explicit about connections to polarity sensitivity, citing Israel (1996) as giving a motivation for the development of NPIs that is the same as those given by Kuryłowicz (1971) for Gen Neg and Bogusławski (1985) for the imperfective of negation: the statement with the emphatic NPI is stronger, i.e. entails the statement without it (as in the case of French pas, for instance.)
One of the interesting observations he makes here is that Gen Neg and pas are alike in losing their 'emphatic Neg' quality and becoming part of normal Neg marking, whereas imperfective of negation and most normal NPIs are alike in retaining the semantics that lets them express a 'strengthened' negation.
Genitive of negation and negated imperfective imperatives are then both cases where the 'less referential' form (Genitive, imperfective) makes a stronger statement than the unmarked form because of the downward-entailingness of the context. This is interestingly parallel to Kadmon and Landman's account (Kadmon and Landman 1993) of the semantics of any: it induces widening, and is licensed in contexts in which the wider statement is the stronger statement. The imperfective verb form is the wider predicate in Kadmon and Landman's sense, i.e. things which do not count as building events in the denotation of postroil 'built-PF' do count as building events in the denotation of stroil 'built-IMPF'.
24 So under the scope of a negative, an imperfective is stronger than a perfective. Similarly, the semantic partitive (expressed historically by the genitive) is a wider predicate than the non-partitive, and thus negation leads to a stronger statement.
Given the above, we have a connection between Genitive of Negation, imperfective under the scope of negative imperatives and negative polarity items. The connection of these considerations to intensionality is less obvious, but we mention some speculative connections in the final section below. As Susan Rothstein notes (p.c.), the connection is perhaps not so much between imperfectivity or atelicity and 'diminished referentiality' as that there is a connection in each case to a contrast between more constrained and less constrained predicate denotations, which may lead to weaker or stronger statements under negation; diminished referentiality may be a side effect of a less constrained predicate.
Conclusions and further research
Negation and intensionality are certainly not completely alike, nor are partitivity and imperfectivity, but we have made some steps toward identifying generalizations that need to be accounted for, and second, toward finding formal properties through which we can capture the similarities and differences among the phenomena we observe. As Haspelmath (1997) has shown, studying semantic typology can help us map out the semantic space within which languages distinguish different regions, lexically, morphologically, or syntactically. In the phenomena we've looked at here, quite informally, we've seen how the domains that include negation and the intensional verbs have some commonalities that are not initially obvious. English does not put those two kinds of phenomena together in any formal way; Russian and some other languages sometimes do.
What ARE the similarities and differences in this case? Giannakidou (1998) has argued that the main similarity can be captured as non-veridicality. Non-veridicality is a property of the contexts created by negation and by many (but not all) intensional operators (not know). Levinson (2006a) argues, using various cross-linguistic data similar to (but more extensive than) those presented in the first sections of this paper, for the thesis that Irrealis is a negative polarity item, Realis a positive polarity item. What his arguments really point to are parallels between Irrealis marking and NPIs, and hence for similarities between Irrealis-creating operators and Negation and other NPI-licensing operators. He does not give any explicit reason for calling Irrealis an NPI rather the reverse, i.e. rather than calling Negation a species of Irrealis-marking. He does offer some reasons not to be satisfied with Giannakidou's use of nonveridicality as a unifying property (Giannakidou 1998, Giannakidou and Zwarts 1998) , and we have already noted that not all intensional operators (although perhaps all irrealislicensing operators) are nonveridical.
There are also differences between Negation and intensional operators. One important difference is extensionality as tested by the Substitutivity test discussed in Section 2 above: Intensional verbs fail it, negation passes it. A second partial difference is in monotonicity properties. Negation is 'downward-entailing'; whereas intensional verbs may be quasiupward-entailing (Ladusaw 1996) , quasi-downward-entailing, or neither. Zucchi (1999) , inspired by Bennett (1977) , argues that verbs of creation are intensional, even though they generally pass the Substitution test for extensionality 25 . Kratzer (2004) , citing Zucchi, focuses on the fact that atelics don't imply culmination, so that creation verbs don't imply the existence of the created object. Kratzer (2004) can be taken to provide a syntactic implementation of Zucchi's semantic idea by arguing that VPs headed by verbs of creation end up telic, although they are initially atelic. Note, by the way, that atelicity produces such a non-implication-of-existence 'from within' the lexical semantics; a progressive operator accomplishes a similar effect 'from without'.
There is obviously much more work to be done to further dissect the relevant phenomena and the relevant properties so as to try to end up with an explanatory account of the distribution of forms and meanings in this area. One hypothesis that appears worth further exploration is the following: Non-veridicality might naturally license decreased existential commitment. Intensionality might rather license decreased specificity. These are just crude pointers to the kinds of semantic properties that might be explored: the idea is to study three things together: (i) semantic properties of intensional, negative, and other operators; (ii) semantic properties of the sorts of NPs that have restricted occurrence (any student, the slightest sound, any book whatever, Russian genitive NPs, and others), and of imperfective aspect and restrictions on its occurrence; and (iii) possible shifts in semantic properties of 'ordinary' NPs when occurring under various operators. The connection to Kadmon and Landman's account of licensed 'widening' leading to 'strengthening' may be one promising avenue for viewing these varied phenomena as belonging to a common family.
